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the judgment debtor, by bringing within twenty years an action of
debt upon the judgment, thereby creating a new limitation period
2
for another twenty years.'
GoRDoN G. OIDEAM, JR.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STATE REGULATORY
JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATION
DOING BUSINESS BY MAIL
Travelers Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950)
A Nebraska non-profit membership corporation, without offices or
paid agents in Virginia, was conducting a mail-order health insurance
business. Its approximately 800 members voluntarily and without
compensation recommended prospective new members, whereupon
the home office in Omaha mailed application blanks. Upon return
of these, with the requisite fee, the applicants were considered for
membership and elected thereto in Nebraska. Certificates were then
mailed to them, subject to return within ten days "if not satisfactory."
The corporation had no offices or designated agents in Virginia, but
it did cause many sick-benefit claims to be investigated within the
state.' The corporation refused to comply with the Virginia Blue Sky
Law,2 notably the provision requiring designation of the secretary of

state to accept service of process for suits filed in Virginia. The State
Corporation Commission served notice upon the corporation at its
home office by registered mail. It appeared specially to contest
jurisdiction. The Commission then issued an order directing it to
cease and desist, until compliance with Virginia law, from further
solicitation of or sales of certificates to Virginia residents by any
advertisement from within or without the state by mail or otherwise.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the order and
the corporation appealed. HELD, on these facts Virginia has jurisdic12Ratchford v. Covington County Stock Co., 172 Ala. 461, 55 So. 806 (1911);
Crane v. Muta, 157 Fla. 85, 26 So.2d 670 (1946); CRANALL, FLoSImA CoMMoN
Lw PRAcT CE §177 (1928).
1Page 646 of the opinion.
2

VA.

CODE ANN.

§§3848(47),(5),(51),(53),(55) (1942).
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tion over defendant corporation for the purpose of entering an injunctive order conditioned on appointment of the secretary of state
as agent for service of process.
The members of the court expressed divergent views on subsidiary
procedural questions. Some regarded the appeal as premature until
some action should be taken to enforce the order, and there was
opposition to the assumption of jurisdiction in personam by mere service by mail in another state.3 Seven justices met in accord on the
problem of jurisdictional requisites. The following inquiry will be
directed primarily toward determining what factors entered into their
decision and whether traditional concepts have been significantly
altered.
Justice Black, in the majority opinion, points to three possible
grounds on which jurisdiction may be rested. First, the corporation
was in a sense doing business in Virginia, since its transactions there
were not "isolated or short-lived" but rather created "continuing obligations" between it and resident members. 4 Justice Douglas in his
concurring opinion expressed the view that even isolated acts of solicitation are sufficient to confer jurisdiction, and said in addition that
the activity of resident certificate holders in recommending prospects
without pay rendered them corporate agents."
A second circumstance noted is the availability of the Virginia
courts to the corporation. 6 Any foreign plaintiff, however, can sue a
defendant in Virginia, regardless of whether plaintiff is doing any
business there at all. In further justification of the decision, a convenience-of-suit argument is made to the effect that if Virginia is
without power to require appointment of an agent to receive service,
then the only forum available to injured resident certificate holders
would be Nebraska.7 Whenever litigants are domiciled far apart, the
home of one is necessarily an inconvenient forum for the other.
Other than the factors referred to above, the finding of jurisdiction
is supported only by such phrases as "fair play," "substantial justice,"
and "minimum contacts" constituting "presence" for purposes of suit.$
3At pp. 657, 658 (dissenting opinion).
4
At p. 648.
5At p. 654. Cottra: Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co., 218 U.S. 573
(1910); Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U.S. 727 (1885); St. Clair v. Cox,
106 U.S. 350 (1882); Frawley, Bundy & Wilcox v. Pennsylvania Casualty Co., 124
Fed. 259 (3(1 Cir. 1903).
OAt p. 648.
7At pp. 648-649.
SAt p. 648.
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These expressions, at best, merely pose the problem and are so vague
as to be virtually worthless as jurisdictional tests, a fact that Justice
Black himself formerly recognized. 9 Perhaps the most potent factual
item was the investigation in Virginia of claims for losses, 10 but the
opinion, oddly enough, places very little emphasis on this."'
The International Shoe, 12 Osborn13 and Hoopeston14 cases are the
three authorities cited as expressing controlling principles. The first
is clearly inapplicable; paid employees of the corporation not only
resided and did their business principally in Washington but also
made a practice of renting, at the expense of the corporation, space
for carrying on solicitation of orders. The Osborn case is equally
beside the mark; the regulatory statute attacked was expressly limited
to certain types of insurance companies legally authorized to do
business in Virginia, and the appellant was such a company. The
Hoopeston case, containing another of Mr. Justice Black's opinions, is
more nearly in point, although appellant reciprocal insurance association had for years taken a license under the older regulatory law, was
engaged to a large extent in insuring immovables located in New York
against fire losses, and serviced the policies both by sending its engineers to encourage reduction of hazards and by repairing or replacing damaged property.
This being the status of the authorities cited as favorable, the trend
of other decisions merits brief examination. To subject itself to jurisdiction, a foreign corporation originally had to act directly or through
duly authorized officers or agents.' 5 Mere solicitation of business by
such agents, even when regular and continuous, was ordinarily insufficient of itself to bring the foreign employer within the terms of
statutes relating to substituted service of process on foreign corpora9

See bis vigorous concurring opinion in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 822, 824 (1945).
10 At pp. 646, 648.
11Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245 (1909); Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U.S. 407 (1905); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899); Union Mut. Life Co. of
Iowa v. Bailey, 99 Colo. 570, 64 P.2d 1267 (1937).
121nternational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
13 Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940).
14 Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943).
15 People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918); Herndon-Carter Co. v. James N. Norris, Son & Co., 224 U.S. 496 (1912); Mechanical
Appliance Co. v. Castleman, 215 U.S. 437 (1910); Peterson v. Chicago, R.I. & P.
Ry., 205 U.S. 364 (1907); Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 406
(1903); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
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tions.16

Solicitation within a state of a contract of sale subject to

approval elsewhere, followed by shipment of outside goods into the
state, did not in the opinion of most courts constitute doing business
within the state. 17 And an insurance company receiving applications
of foreign citizens and issuing policies and collecting premiums by
mail was not8 regarded as doing business in the state of residence of
the insured .

The older strict view of solicitation was strongly criticized and
considerably weakened prior to the instant case.' 9 Today solicitation
within a state plus some other activity is generally sufficient to confer
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. 20

Even solicitation by mail

does not immunize the foreign corporation when this practice is
coupled with an additional factor such as receiving payment via an

agent in the state,2 ' or sending into it an adjuster upon whom service
is made.22 Similarly, withdrawal after securing a license and doing

business in the state does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts of
that state as regards suits relating to contracts made there during
16 E.g., People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918);
Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. By., 205 U.S. 530 (1907); see Frene v. Louisville
Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511, 514-517 (D.C. Cir. 1943), in which the authorities
are ably marshaled.
17People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918); Boardman v. S. S. McClure Co., 123 Fed. 614 (D. Minn. 1903); Hastings v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 274 App. Div. 435, 84 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1st Dep't 1948); see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945), and cases cited
therein.
18Boseman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196 (1937); Sasnett v.
Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 90 F.2d 514 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 711 (1937); Cronin v. Unionaid Life Ins. Co., 184 Ark. 493, 42 S.W.2d 758
(1931); Cindrich v. Indiana Travelers Assur. Co., 356 Mo. 1064, 204 S.W.2d 765
(1947); Sanders v. Columbian Prot. Ass'n, 208 S.C. 152, 37 S.E.2d 533 (1946).
Contra: Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n v. Ruge, 242 Fed. 762 (8th Cir. 1917).
19International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); Frene v. Louisville Cement Co.,
134 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
20
E.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S., 310 (1945); International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910); Frene v. Louisville Cement
Co., 134 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
21
E.g., International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910); Beneo v. Yesler, 12 Ore. 40, 7
Pac.22329 (1885).
E.g., Commercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245 (1909); Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U.S. 407 (1905); Union
Mut. Life Co. of Iowa v. Bailey, 99 Colo. 570, 64 P.2d 1267 (1937). But cf.
Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923).
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active operations.2 3 A few cases hold that insuring risks in a state
constitutes doing business there;2 4 and at least one state recently
upheld service on its secretary of state as sufficient in a suit against
a foreign insurance company that issued by mail a policy on the life
of a resident thereof. The question of doing business was brushed
aside, and the court's only reason for this view on the constitutional
25
issue was the convenience-of-suit factor.
Jurisdiction over foreign corporations for the purpose of forcing
foreign mail-order corporations to collect and remit use taxes has been
sustained when they have stores in the taxing state;2 6 and the presence
27
of soliciting agents produces the same result.
The United States Supreme Court previously held in Minnesota
Commercial Men's Association v. Benn 28 that a foreign mail-order
insurance corporation operating under circumstances almost identical
to those in the instant case was not doing business for jurisdictional
purposes, and that service in a suit by a policyholder could not be
validly made on the secretary of the state of his residence. The instant
majority opinion does not expressly overrule the Benn case; it merely
states the facts and then casts the decision aside as no test of jurisdiction for regulatory purposes. 29 The state, as distinct from an individual litigant, is said to have a legitimate interest in the protection
of its residents against risks; and the practical consequences -of insurance contracts in the state where those insured reside, regardless
of where the contract is technically entered into or to be performed,
30
are in themselves sufficient to justify regulation by the state.

23

Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Phelps, 190 U S. 147 (1903); see Hunter

v. Mutual Res. Life Ins. Co., 218 U.S. 573, 589-591 (1910).
24
Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n v. Ruge, 242 Fed. 762 (8th Cir. 1917);
New Orleans v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 207 La. 745, 22 So.2d 51 (1945).
•25 White v. Indiana Travelers Assur. Co., 22 So.2d 137 (La. App. 1945)

semble, federal review not sought.
26

Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941); Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941).
27
Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939).
28261 U.S. 140 (1923); cf. Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204

U.S.298 (1907).

At p. 647.
This theory emerges in the opinions, although it is not essential to the de-

30

cisions, in Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943), Osbora v.
Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940).
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In the face of contrary precedent, the Supreme Court thus justifies
its decision by stating that different purposes require different degrees
of presence. But in addition a convenience-of-suit argument was
stressed. As already noted, the Court was concerned with the fact
that resident certificate holders might be forced to travel great distances to bring suit for any injury. This argument indicates that the
next step in the Osborn-Hoopeston-Travelerschain may be to permit a
citizen to make valid service on a foreign corporation by serving his
secretary of state, or even by mailing the process. If the instant decision is regarded as extending state jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for regulatory purposes only, the citizen will still be enabled
to accomplish indirectly via state regulation what he has been forbidden to achieve directly.3 ' An injunction against all corporate
activity through the mails, if enforceable, would effectively force the
appointment of an agent for service in spite of the fact that a statute
allowing service on a state officer without such appointment would be
invalid against a corporation confining its operations to the mails.
The majority opinion, especially when its rationale is analyzed in
relation to facts in this case that support the decision on other grounds,
marks a serious inroad upon the traditional concept of state regulatory
jurisdiction over foreign corporations doing business by mail. While
such an extension may well be desirable from the standpoint of the
public interest, the reasoning of the Court is at least questionable.
The majority opinion sets the stage for judicial legislation destroying
the established law of jurisdiction in fields other than insurance, and
perhaps in suits by individual citizens.
GAms E. DAvis

RISee dissenting opinion of Justice Minton at p. 658: "An in personam judgment cannot be based upon service by registered letter on a nonresident corporation or a natural person, neither of whom.has ever been within the State of Virginia ....
If that may not be done directly, it may not be done indirectly.
Certainly such service cannot be justified where its purpose is to make substituted
service legal in the future. These non-residents cannot be brought in through
service by registered mail and compelled to designate the Secretary of the Commonwealth as their agent for service of process so that thereafter service may be
effected upon such non-residents by serving the Secretary. So to hold would allow
the State to pull itself up by its own bootstraps."
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